

Approved for Release 10/10/26 : CIA-RDP86-00098R000901000005
FPD 0023-75-3

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

20 JUNE 75

01 of 01

~~CONF~~


EPG 0023/75-3
20 June 1975

FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Military, Political and Economic Data

STATSPEC



FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110022-5

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110022-5

CONFIDENTIAL

i

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA

CONTENTS

Military		
Reduction of Full Time Militia Cadres Criticized		1
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 5 Dec 73)		
Reluctance on Militia Training Overcome		1
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 25 Sep 73)		
25X1B New Radio Equipment for Peking Signal Detachment		3
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 25 Sep 73)		
<div style="background-color: black; height: 50px; width: 100%;"></div>		
Briefs: Nation-wide Assessment of Instruction Teams		13
Activities of Yunnan Hospitals		13
Political		
History Praising Lin Criticized		14
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 18 Feb 75)		
PLA Unit Details Study of Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship		28
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 18 Feb 75)		
Party's Basic Line Stressed in Lin Criticism		31
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 18 Feb 75)		
Lin Piao's "Three Fierce Actions" Criticized		34
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 28 Oct 73)		
Education on Criticizing Lin Described		36
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 11 Sep 73)		
Foochow Regiment Pledges Unity		37
(CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 3 Sep 73)		
Agriculture		
Efforts to Increase Farm Output		39
Afforestation and Timber Production		39

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY

REDUCTION OF FULL TIME MILITIA CADRES CRITICIZED

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 5 Dec 73 p 4

[Article: "Letters to the Editor: The Number of Full Time Militia Cadres Should Not Be Reduced"]

[Text] Comrade Editor:

Aroused by the spirit of the Tenth Party Congress, the situation in militia work is excellent and progress has been made in meeting Chairman Mao's call "to organize contingents of the people's militia on a big scale" and "make everyone a soldier." Yet in spite of this situation, the number of full time militia cadres in some districts has been reduced.

Take the situation in our county as a case in point. Full time militia cadres in some cases have not been properly apportioned, to the extent that some relatively large communes have only full time militia cadre. Aside from Central Committee work, they rarely have time to do militia work. Especially in view of the increase in military equipment, the new weaponry and the increased responsibilities related to war preparation work, that a relatively large commune should have only one full time militia cadre is insufficient, let alone reducing the number already allocated.

In my opinion, to reduce the number of full time militia cadres at a time when we are putting into practice the spirit of the Tenth Party Congress, increasing our war preparedness and doing well in preparing for wars of aggression is wrong and an injustice to the establishment of the people's militia. For this reason I suggest that the concerned departments in each area deal seriously with the establishment of full time militia command departments and that the number of full time militia cadres be increased, rather than decreased. [Signed] Li Yeh-min [2621 6460 3046] Administrator [kan-shih], Militia Command, Shu-ian County, Kirin Province.

RELUCTANCE ON MILITIA TRAINING OVERCOME

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 25 Sep 73 p 3

[Article: "Actively Train Militia Antiaircraft Cadres"]

[Text] A certain antiaircraft artillery regiment of the artillery

2

in the Nanking Unit have actively carried out the work of training antiaircraft artillery cadres in the militia. They have successively held eight training sessions for militia cadres and trained more than 700 militia cadre in antiaircraft artillery thereby effectively strengthening militia building.

This antiaircraft artillery regiment is responsible for war preparedness duty, war preparedness training and production. Under such conditions some comrades felt that the responsibilities of the unit are many and yet the unit must also engage in militia work. There were many contradictions and it was feared that the task which the upper echelons had given the unit would not be completed. In light of this situation the party committee of the regiment organized the party committee members to repeatedly study the basic line of the party and the general line of socialist building so that everyone realized that many tasks and little time is a fact of life. But if they took line as the key link, were enthusiastic and made reasonable arrangements, then they could complete each task. The party committee incorporated militia work into the order of the day and made each standing committee member and each party committee member responsible for specific militia work. At the same time they strengthened and coordinated the organization for carrying out militia work and set up a militia training small group which took [members of] the rotational training team [tui] as the hardcore cadre thereby effectively strengthening the leadership for militia work. In June of this year [1973] the local militia command requested training for a group of militia cadres in antiaircraft artillery. At that time the unit had just [begun] combined training for an entering class. The artillery and the instructors were both comparatively pressed. But, if they could not ensure that the militia would have a certain number of artillery pieces and hardcore cadres [instructors] for training, this would influence the training results of hardcore cadres for the militia. Since the militia is drawn from the workers in the plants and if the time spent on training was too long, the production at the factories could be effected. In this situation the party committee made a point of opening up investigation and study and actively thought of ways to set up a reasonable distribution [of training.] With the assistance of fraternal units [tan wei] the quality of training for the units and the militia was effectively assured. During the period of militia training Man Mao-hua [5335 2021 5478], deputy secretary of the party committee and 0795 commander of the regiment, not only grasped unit training but also militia training while he was staying in a company. He regularly held discussion meetings with the militia training group in order to understand the training situation and give specific assistance to the instructors. In order to solve the difficulties in training the first and second militia gunners, Juo Mo chung [6753 1075 1813], party committee member responsible for militia training and deputy chief of staff, went deep into the training areas despite an illness, endured the scorching sun, helped the militia correct their

CONFIDENTIAL

3

performance and repeatedly set an example. Within a short period of training 92 percent of the hardcore militia cadres had achieved a rating of good or above.

This regimental party committee also taught the cadres and fighters to study the revolutionary spirit of the militia in diligently studying and arduously training. The party branch of each company taking "the militia has done much, what have we accomplished?" as the theme organized the cadres and fighters to carry out discussions. Everyone felt that they must certainly learn from the militia in order to make new contributions in carrying out war preparedness to counter wars of aggression. The 2nd antiaircraft mechanized battery [2894 6647] together with the local militia developed revolutionary emulation activities of mutual help and study which effectively strengthened militia and unit building.

NEW RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR PEKING SIGNAL DETACHMENT

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 25 Sep 73 p 2

[Article: "Proceed as Quickly as Possible Along a New Road"]

[Excerpts] In order to protect the motherland the upper echelons turned over new radio equipment to a signal detachment of a certain unit [pu] in the Peking Unit. The design of the new equipment was complicated. There were over 10,000 component parts, nearly a 100 tuning switches and many unfamiliar mechanical terms.

Enthusiastic training activities in communications were begun. Day and night the cadres and fighters worked at the radio station comparing two thick manuals in order to understand the functions of the equipment. They memorized a great many machinery components and studied the complicated blueprints. Since there were no teachings materials, they boldly pushed ahead and together studied [the manuals]. Because there were no training instruments, they repaired old [equipment] and made use of discontinued equipment or manufactured their own. On cold winter days the inside of the mobile radio station unit was as cold as an icy cellar, yet everyone, despite cold fingers which could not tap out the messages, insisted on practicing. In the summer when the inside of the vehicle was as hot as an oven and the seat poured like rain, everyone again insisted on practicing. Teletype transmission [tien-ch'uan yin-tzu fa-pao 7193/0278/0603/1516/4099/1032] was the key technique in mastering the new equipment. When typing on the teletype the fingers must type in close coordination the same as playing a piano.

During training practice another new problem came to their attention. On one field training exercise, the communication signal with the main station was cut. The comrades looked at the equipment and examined over 100 components but could not find the cause. Someone

CONFIDENTIAL

without reason, hit the equipment and the signal returned. The repair technician told everyone that this phenomena is called a "concealed breakdown." If you want to overcome the problem, you must not only understand the technology but the mechanical theory as well. This breakdown taught everyone a good lesson. The comrades of each radio station resolutely insisted on the concept of using practice on the front line to guide the study of technology and theory. They collectively took in hand the editing and writing of "local teaching materials" of approximately 80,000 words in length. Over forty times they successively asked the workers and teachers in Nanking and Wuhan to discuss the materials and they sent 16 people away for study so that the quality of training was comparatively heightened in a well-grounded way.

Once while carrying out an assignment in war preparedness the volume of messages reached as high as several ten thousand units. Each station was busy until late in the night. The comrades discovered that going through a type of "network organization which is directed toward individual communications," i.e., a work style in which one station must relay a message to the next, was totally not suitable to the requirements of the work. Some comrades boldly suggested that this situation be changed so that when a message was sent many stations could receive it at the same time. This suggestion came to the attention of the leading cadres of the signal department. They quickly organized a three-in-one technical small group including leading cadres, radio operators and mechanical service personnel, fully mobilized the masses and together with them carried out scientific studies.

From the war years to the present Chang Fu [1728 3940], head of the communication office, has not been separated from the front line of communication and is an old fighter with practical experience. Now, he once again mustered his energies and together with everyone else looked for innovations. He made a detailed investigation, carried out over 100 experiments with the radio stations and analyzed each facet of the contradiction based on his many years of personal, practical experience. He discovered that the principal cause for the many failures at the beginning was due to the highly accurate frequency of the equipment and the equipment's comparative sophistication so that when every substation, all of which had high frequency transmission, came on at the same time interference and a strong blockage of the signal [resulted]. Once he had found the cause, Chang, together with two staff officers, went to the main radio station to conduct experiments repeatedly. Finally they achieved a communication liaison that is one which was a radio network having many lines, many stations and many modes [fang-shih 2455/1709]. This happy result received the appraisal of concerned departments which saw that the new work proposal enhanced contact and efficiency was improved 7 to 10 times. This opened up a new road for improving our army's communication network.

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CONFIDENTIAL

13

BRIEFS

NATION-WIDE ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUCTION TEAMS--Great advances have been made throughout the army in organizing instruction teams [chiao-tao tui] this year, and at this point 75% of the basic-level cadres in the entire army have attended sessions on a rotational basis in their respective units. The instruction teams throughout the nation have grasped criticizing Lin Piao and rectifying their work style as their primary area of concern, and, at the same time, all of the various branches and types of units have seen to it that the training they offer is based on the particular needs of their units in actual wartime conditions. The instruction teams have endeavored to raise the cadres' consciousness of line struggle and also to raise their political and military skills levels. As a result, the cadres have all been well received when they return to their units, and the fighters who greet them have all gleefully remarked how happy they are that their cadres have been made proficient in both military and civil affairs. Furthermore, this year the party committees of several units have done their utmost to see to it that they continue the practice of sending out their key leading cadres to serve as instructors in the instruction teams. (Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 11 Oct 73 p 1)

ACTIVITIES OF YUNNAN HOSPITALS--Medical personnel totaling 1574 from every unit [tan wei] in the K'un-ming Unit were organized into 140 medical teams and sent to the rural border areas to serve the peasants. Medical personnel from Hospital No 61 made more than 7000 visits and performed more than 60 operations in the mountainous area of Hsi-meng. Medical personnel from Hospital No 140 conducted training classes for 50 barefoot doctors in Chien-shui County. Wang Yu-lien [3769 3768 5581], deputy director of the outpatient department of Hospital No 67, performed 38 operations for trachoma. Medical personnel from Hospital No 63 combined western and Chinese medicine to treat chronic bronchitis among the peasants. (K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 26 Jun 73 p 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

14

POLITICAL

HISTORY PRAISING LIN CRITICIZED

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 18 Feb 75 p 1-2

[Article: "Bankruptcy of 'The Annals of Master Lin'" by the mass criticism group of the Military and Political University]

[Text] The bourgeois ambitionist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary double-dealer and traitor Lin Piao and his sworn confederates, following the example of Confucius who revised "The Spring and Autumn Annals," concocted a reactionary book of history--"History of Two-line Struggle in the Party" ("History of Struggle" in brief)--before and after the 2nd Plenum of the 9th CCP Central Committee. The book comprehensively falsifies the history of the party and frantically sings the praises of Lin Piao. Actually "The Annals of Master Lin" is a monument erected to Lin Piao.

Great leader Chairman Mao points out: "To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary first of all to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counterrevolutionary class."

In the spring of 1970 Lin Piao dished out his anti-party political program and insisted on installing a chairman of the state, vainly attempting to usurp the supreme power of the party and state. It was at that moment that the Lin Piao group, employing conspiratorial means behind the back of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, engaged in counterrevolutionary activities of concocting the "History of Struggle." They declared blatantly: "In writing the history of the party we should write about Lin Piao" and should put Lin Piao "in the position of leader" and see the "greatness" of Lin Piao through the history of the party. They dressed up as "representative of the correct line" Lin Piao who stood on the right opportunist line in the struggle between the two lines and praised as a "military strategist of the proletariat" Lin Piao who pushed the bourgeois military line, attempting to prove that "leadership fell historically" on the head of Lin Piao, and creating a historical basis for Lin Piao to launch his counterrevolutionary coup d'etat. "History of Struggle" was highly appreciated by Lin Piao. It became a blueprint with which Lin Piao's sworn confederates distorted history and sang the praises of Lin Piao. It became the basic materials with which the large and small "fleets" of the Lin Piao anti-party clique conducted counter-revolutionary public opinion. It became Lin Piao's important instrument of public opinion for launching his counterrevolutionary coup d'etat and "political offensive."

CONFIDENTIAL

15

To criticize thoroughly the counterrevolutionary crime of the Lin Piao group who concocted the "History of Struggle" and distorted and falsified the history of the struggle between the two lines in the Party and to expose penetratingly the true face of Lin Piao as agent of the bourgeoisie--this is our combat task when broadening, deepening and persevering in the criticize Lin, criticize Confucius movement.

1--Chairman Mao says: "The history of our party is, it may be said, a history of armed struggle." ("Introducing 'The Communist'") It is over this fundamental question of armed struggle that the "History of Struggle" falsifies history. Right from the beginning it praises Lin Piao as the "builder" and "wise commander" of our army, thus creating "a great starting point" for Lin Piao to "follow" Chairman Mao "closely at all times." It obliterates leaders of the Nan-ch'ang Uprising and, with ulterior motive, represents Lin Piao as the leader, saying preposterously that Lin Piao leading part of the military units in the Nan-ch'ang Uprising "joined forces" with Chairman Mao in Ching kangshan, that after arrival in Ching kangshan Lin Piao carried out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line "most loyally," that subsequently he "unremittingly" waged struggle against Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line, and that in the Long March he waged a "resolute struggle" against Chang Kuo-t'ao's right opportunism. This is turning history upside down.

Great leader Chairman Mao is the builder and commander of the PLA. Under the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought, the Nan-ch'ang Uprising fired the first shot at the Kuomintang reactionaries. As everybody knows, the Nan-ch'ang Uprising was led by Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ho Lung, and Yeh T'ing, and the joining of forces in Ching kangshan was that part of the military units led by Comrades Chu Te and Ch'en I and the Peasant Army of Hunan moved to the Ching kangshan to meet Chairman Mao. Lin Piao was neither leader of the Nan-ch'ang Uprising nor leader of the military unit left behind in the Nan-ch'ang Uprising still less leader "leading the military unit to 'Ching kangshan' to join forces with Chairman Mao. That part of history was not glorious for Lin Piao. At the time the military unit in the Nan-ch'ang Uprising was moving to Layu in Kiangsi, Lin Piao, leader of the 7th company, 2nd battalion, 73rd regiment deserted and fled in the direction of Meikuan, being pessimistic and uncertain about the future of revolution, and rejoined his ranks only when he found no way out.

In the struggle in Ching kangshan whether to hold aloft the red banner of "an armed independent regime of workers and peasants" or to uphold the ideology of roving rebel bands was a fundamental question in the struggle between the two lines. Under the influence of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's liquiditorism, Lin Piao became pessimistic and disappointed at the future of revolution, and doubted "how long the red flag could last." On many occasions Lin Piao disseminated pessimistic views, saying that the Ching kangshan base area could not be maintained. At the Jui-chin

CONFIDENTIAL

16

Conference of the front committee of the Red Fourth Army in May 1929, Lin Piao, proceeding from the rightist viewpoint, held that the arduous job of building a political power when the high tide of revolution was still far away would be futile, and he opposed Chairman Mao's correct plan to build the Fukien-Kiangsi-Chekiang revolutionary base areas. Subsequently, Chairman Mao wrote a long letter, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," to Lin Piao, seriously and patiently educating him. In that letter Chairman Mao criticized Lin Piao for making a pessimistic appraisal of the situation, for "underestimating the subjective force of revolution and overestimating the force of counter-revolution." Chairman Mao pointed out that Lin Piao "does not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish red political power in the guerrilla areas" and that "the theory that we must first win over the masses on a countrywide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution." When this letter was put into "The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" the Central Committee of the Party, complying with Lin Piao's request, omitted his name and expunged some content. But, Lin Piao was always dissatisfied with Chairman Mao's criticism. In September 1969, in his reactionary message, "To the Ching kangshan Again" he blatantly opposed Chairman Mao's criticism, saying, "As a man of determination and a firm believer in Marxism-Leninism, I am not apprehensive that a single spark can start a prairie fire." Thus, he attempted to reverse the verdict of history. The "History of Struggle" not only covers up the error committed by Lin Piao in the Ching kangshan days but also praises Lin Piao for "most loyally" carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. It echoes with the lie, "a man of determination and a firm believer in Marxism-Leninism."

In the central revolutionary base area the Red Army went through five counterrevolutionary "encirclement and suppression campaigns" of the Kuomintang. Under the direct command of Chairman Mao, the Red Army won great victories in the first, second and third countercampaigns against "encirclement and suppression." At the 4th Plenum of the 6th Party Central Committee in January 1931, Wang Ming usurped leadership of the Party Central Committee. In January 1932 Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line entailed "occupying one or two key central cities as the starting point for victory in revolution in one or several provinces" thus completely negating Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, "encircle the cities with the rural districts."

Instead of "unremittingly" waging struggle, Lin Piao closely followed Wang Ming and proposed to the Military Commission in 23 July 1932 that the central Red Army "move out of the Hunan area obliquely," "finish Ho Chien and occupy key cities in Hunan" and "then seize major cities." At the conference of the Central Bureau of the soviet area held in Ning-tu in August 1932, the Wang Ming "left" opportunists frantically opposed Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and seized Chairman Mao's leadership over the party and Red Army of the central soviet area. Lin

CONFIDENTIAL

17

Piao never attended this conference. Yet the "History of Struggle" fabricates the story that at the meeting "indomitable and fearless of repression, he solemnly pointed out: 'Mao Tse-tung is indispensable to the Chinese revolution'." The concocters of the "History of Struggle" represent Lin Pao as a genius who discovered the leader of the proletarian revolution, and do everything they can to boast about Lin Piao. They are shameless in the extreme! After Chairman Mao was excluded from the leadership of the central soviet area, the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" still won victory, thanks to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line that had gone deep into people's minds. The "History of Struggle" attributes this victory to Lin Piao's "wise command." Let's ask: How could Lin Piao, who was only commander of a part of the military force and who had already switched over to the Wang Ming line, command the whole First Front Red Army and the local armed forces of the central Soviet area in the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression"? The Lin Piao group boasts about Lin Piao in these exaggerated terms for the purpose of dressing Lin Piao up as "direct commander" of the Liberation Army and with a view to preparing the reader for what is to follow in the history of the party.

During the fifth countercampaign against "encirclement and suppression", the operational principles of the so-called "conventional warfare" prescribed by Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line were forced upon the Red Army, and anti-Marxist things like "engage the enemy outside the gates," "dividing the troops into six routes," "short, swift thrusts," "blockhouse warfare" and "attrition warfare" were introduced to the military units. And Lin Piao was an ardent exponent and enthusiastic promoter of this set of "new principles." On 14 February and 3 April 1934 Lin Piao proposed to the Military Commission "construction of new fortified blockhouses to be defended at all costs." Toward the end of April the situation in the countercampaign against "encirclement and suppression" was very unfavorable to us, and the commanders and fighters of the Red Army were increasingly skeptical and dissatisfied with Wang Ming's line. On 4 May, Lin Piao wrote to the Military Commission, saying: "Properly used, the blockhouses will play a great part." On 17 June Lin Piao dished out his sinister essay, "On Short, Swift Thrusts" in "War and Revolution" No. 4, openly defending Wang Ming's opportunist military line and attacking Chairman Mao's policy of luring the enemy in deep. He raved: "We should know that luring the enemy in deep is no longer a dependable, effective method of dealing with the enemy who suffered sustained disastrous defeats and learned countless lessons of blood." He claimed that "short, swift thrusts can win not only tactical victory but victory in the campaign as well." Further, making plans for the Wang Ming line he rigged up 26 concrete measures for carrying out "short, swift thrusts." Wang Ming, Lin Piao and swindlers of their type knew nothing about the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution and committed mistakes repeatedly. Chairman Mao pointed out: "The mistake here arose from a rightist viewpoint."

CONFIDENTIAL

18

The leaders feared the enemy as if he were a tiger, set up defenses everywhere, fought defensive actions at every stop and did not dare to advance to the enemy's rear and attack him there, which would have been to our advantage, or boldly to lure the enemy troops in deep so as to herd them together and annihilate them. As a result, the whole base area was lost and the Red Army had to undertake the Long March of over 12,000 kilometers." ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War")

In January 1935 the Central Committee of the Party held the Tsunyi Conference of great historical significance, putting an end to the domination of Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line in the Party Central Committee and establishing Chairman Mao's leading position in the whole party. At the conference, Lin Piao assumed an ambiguous attitude and refrained from attacking Wang Ming's line; actually, he continued to take the stand against Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. The "History of Struggle" invents the lie that Lin Piao "at the Tsunyi Conference waged a heroic struggle against the 'left' opportunist line and made an outstanding contribution in defending Chairman Mao's leading position in the whole Party." Chairman Mao's position as the leader of the whole Party came into being as a matter of course in revolutionary struggle and was by no means artificially established. The concocters of the "History of Struggle" represent the establishment of Chairman Mao's position as the leader as the result of Lin Piao's "defense." This is a shameless betrayal of historical materialism and is a vicious distortion of our Party history.

After the Tsunyi Conference, Chairman Mao exercised direct leadership in the work of the Central Military Commission and personally directed the great campaign famous in the history of our army, that is, crossing the Ch'ih-shui River four times. During the campaign Lin Piao stood opposed to Chairman Mao's strategic plan and continued to push Wang Ming's right line of flightism. Toward the end of January 1935 the central Red Army crossed the Ch'ih-shui River the first time, ready to cross the Yangtze River to the north to join forces with the Fourth Front Army and to march north to resist Japan. In view of the fact that several hundred thousand enemy troops were laying a big ring of encirclement, Chairman Mao wisely and resolutely decided not to cross the river for the time being, looked for a new mobility in the Szechwan-Yunnan-Kweichow area, and ordered Lin Piao to lead the I Army Corps to concentrate forces at Cha-hsi (Wei-hsin). Lin Piao disobeyed the order. He made it known that "it is inadvisable for him to move south to concentrate forces at Cha-hsi." Moreover, he wanted the Military Commission to move north to concentrate forces near him. The Military Commission issued eight orders in six days, and Lin Piao dragged on for four days while the enemy situation was extremely grave before he moved his troops to Cha-hsi. Upon perceiving that the enemy in Kweichow was defenseless, Chairman Mao suddenly marched troops to the east, crossed the Ch'ih-shui River the second time and directed the Red Army to seize

CONFIDENTIAL

19

the favorable opportunity to annihilate the enemy and liberate Tsunyi for the second time. Lin Piao, who took the rightist stand and feared the enemy, put forward views opposite to Chairman Mao's, saying it was not possible for his troops to return in a roundabout way to the south of the Lashan Pass to besiege the enemy and that, besides, it would not be easy for his troops to attack uphill and capture the position. He lingered, afraid to go forward. Only when he was strongly urged on by Chairman Mao did Lin Piao lead the troops toward Tsunyi. Under Chairman Mao's wise command, the Red Army wiped out 20 regiments of enemy troops, winning the first big battle after the Long March. Therefore, Chairman Mao directed the central Red Army to cross the Ch'ih-shui River for the third time and the fourth time. Feigning attack in the east and striking in the west and driving south at one time and north at another, the Red Army crossed the Chin-sha River, leaving several hundred thousand enemy troops far behind. In the course of an ever-victorious march, Lin Piao colluded with P'eng Te-huai and falsely charged that Chairman Mao "exercised incompetent command" "causing the collapse of the armed forces." Lin Piao telephoned P'eng Te-huai: "The present leadership is incompetent, and you should come forward to assume command." He wrote a letter to the Central Committee, requesting removal of Chairman Mao from his post. At the Hui-li Conference, Chairman Mao sternly criticized Lin Piao and crushed their plot to seize power. The allegation made in the "History of Struggle" that Lin Piao "resolutely took the side of Chairman Mao and carried out Chairman Mao's wise decision" was completely groundless!

In June 1935 the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces in Mao-kung area, Szechwan. Chang Kuo-t'ao opposed Chairman Mao's correct line of marching north to resist Japan, proposed his right opportunist line of flying into the minority areas of Szechwan, Sikong and Tibet, and engaged in conspiratorial activities to split the Party and the Red Army. In this acute struggle between the two lines, Lin Piao wanted to go over to Chang Kuo-t'ao. Without any sense of shame he praised Chang Kuo-t'ao's line as "correct," arguing: If Chang Kuo-t'ao's "line is wrong, why does he have so many men? How many men do we have!" Chang Kuo-t'ao recognized the worth of Lin Piao and named Lin Piao as member of the bogus Central Committee and member of the bogus Military Commission when they were set up. This iron-clad fact brands as a lie the allegation in the "History of Struggle" that Lin Piao "waged a resolute struggle against Chang Kuo-t'ao's right opportunism."

In October 1935 Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee led the central Red Army to northern Shensi and proposed developing and consolidating the anti-Japanese base area in northern Shensi and bringing about a nationwide high tide in the war of resistance against Japan. At that time, dissatisfied with Chairman Mao's correct line, Lin Piao wrote letters and sent telegrams to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee eight times during December 1935, expressing his determination

to leave the northern Shensi revolutionary base area for southern Shensi to fight a "guerrilla war." He wanted to set up an independent kingdom against the Central Committee. He wrote in one letter: "If I continue to work in the First Front Army without doing anything good with the work, I will definitely not do it, nor should I be forced to do it." Further, he sent a telegram direct to Chairman Mao, saying he "would rather endure disciplinary action" than stay in northern Shensi. What Lin Piao did openly to oppose Chairman Mao's correct line is a marvelous satire on such words of praise as "consistently followed closely" in the "History of Struggle."

2--In the eight years of war of resistance, Lin Piao spent half of his time recuperating and was on the frontline for only half a year. Yet, "History of Struggle" does a great deal to turn history upside down, seizing upon his brief presence during the period of the war of resistance, and dresses Lin Piao up as a man of meritorious deeds in the war of resistance. It is nonsensically alleged that Lin Piao "followed Chairman Mao's great strategic plan" and "strongly criticized the Kuomintang reactionaries' 'theory of national subjugation' and Wang Ming's right capitulationist line," that in the Anti-Japanese Military and Political college he "resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and trained large numbers of cadres for the war of resistance against Japan," that at the 7th National Congress of the Party he "held aloft the great red banner of Mao Tsetung Thought, brilliantly expounded our Party's mass line and strongly refuted various kinds of opportunist fallacies." Was that the historical fact? Not at all.

During the war of resistance against Japan, Chairman Mao formulated for our party the political line of the anti-Japanese national united front and the strategic policy, "independent guerrilla war in mountain regions with initiative in our hands." At the Conference of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Lo-ch'uan in August 1937, Chairman Mao specially emphasized the countering of the capitulationist tendency in the party at the time, the principle of independence and initiative, that is, our party and army must not become dependent on the Kuomintang either politically or militarily and the most important thing was to uphold the Communist Party's absolute leadership over the Eighth Route Army. Wang Ming, who switched from the extreme "left" to the extreme right, proposed his right capitulationist line--"everything through the united front," "obey the united front in everything." He proposed his wrong strategic policy of fighting a war of movement under the 'united' command of Chiang Kai-shek: this would mean walking into the trap set by Chiang Kai-shek who conspired to restrict, merge and wipe out the Communists. Standing on Wang Ming's right capitulationist line, Lin Piao opposed the spirit of the Lo-ch'uan Conference and opposed Chairman Mao's strategic policy of an "independent guerrilla war in mountainous regions with the initiative in our hands." He proceeded to the North China frontline and refused to carry out Chairman Mao's instructions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21

to deploy the troops in the Tai-hang and T'ai-yuan mountain regions in southeastern Shansi and mobilize the masses on a wide scale to create anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas. Instead, he wanted to fight big battles in coordination with the Kuomintang army. He advised our army "not to take mass work as the central task" and cried out, "The present...is a good opportunity for us to start a war of movement." At the Lin-fen Conference held by the North China Bureau and the Eighth Route Army in the spring of 1938, Lin Piao continued to peddle Wang Ming's wrong strategic policy of "laying emphasis on a war of movement." Dwelling on the question of strategic transformation from the civil conventional war to the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in his "The Problems of War and Strategy," Chairman Mao pointed out that this "had provoked a serious controversy between the Central Committee and some of the military cadres," including the serious controversy with Lin Piao. Lin Piao closely followed Wang Ming and did not "follow Chairman Mao's great strategic plan." Such was the truth of history. *

Chairman Mao personally founded the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College and took up the chairmanship of the college education committee. He formulated an educational policy for the college and personally gave lectures in the college. Large numbers of fine cadres were trained under the nourishing care of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tsetung Thought, contributing to the victory for the war of resistance against Japan and to the building of our party and army. The concocters of the "History of Struggle" fished for political capital for Lin Piao seizing on the fact that he was for a time concurrently president of the college. As a matter of fact, Lin Piao did not work for long in the college and he made many errors. In his report, "The Educational Policy of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College" delivered in 2 May 1938, he openly declared: "Politically, our central feature is the united front" and teaching in the college "should be conducted in a way more suited to the united front." He opposed teaching Marxism-Leninism and conducting class education. This was the same tune as the one Wang Ming sang: "The Anti-Japanese Military and Political College is a school of the united front, not a private school of a certain party or faction." Wang Ming and Lin Piao's distortion of the character of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College was a downright act of capitulation and betrayal. In July 1939, Chairman Mao clearly pointed out in his "Instructions on the question of consolidating the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College" that the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College was not a school of the united front but a cadres school of the 8th Route Army under the leadership of the party and that class education, party education and work must be intensified considerably. It was a stern criticism of the class capitulationist line pushed by Wang Ming and Lin Piao in the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College.

CONFIDENTIAL

As for the allegation in the "History of Struggle" that Lin Piao "strongly criticized the Kuomintang reactionaries' theory of national subjugation" and Wang Ming's right capitulationist line," there was nothing of the sort. Lin Piao eulogized and never criticized Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. The 6th Plenum of the 6th CCP Central Committee held in October 1938 overcame in the main Wang Ming's right opportunist line. Even in July 1940, Lin Piao pushed an anti-party article titled "Chinese People's National Liberation War in Three Years" in a foreign magazine, devoting much space to singing the praises of the Kuomintang army's so-called "brilliant military achievements," calling upon "all progressive forces of the country to rally" to the "central government" headed by Chiang Kai-shek and calling upon "all Chinese armies to subordinate themselves to the unified headquarters." Virtually, this would mean "uniting" the Communist Party with Chiang Kai-shek's "central government" and "uniting" the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army with Chiang Kai-shek's "headquarters." In January 1942, while passing through Lan-chow on his way home from the Soviet Union Lin Piao fraternized with the Kuomintang officials, which was important news in press circles. In his telegram to the Party Central Committee, Lin Piao, agreeably surprised by the favors he got, said this: "The officials here are exceptionally nice to me and our relations are very harmonious. It is a matter of great consolation that our views on state affairs are very sincere and identical." Look! To what length Lin Piao went in pushing Wang Ming's rightist line of class capitulationism!

Our Party held the 7th National Congress in April 1945. The Congress decided on the Party's line and set Mao Tsetung Thought as the guiding principle of all work of the Party. Chairman Mao pointed out in his political report titled "On the Coalition Government": "The people, the people alone are the motive force in the making of history." "Educated by war, the people will win war, win peace and win progress." With Chairman Mao's words still in his ears, Lin Piao jumped out and aired an opposing view. In the name of expounding the mass line at the congress, he peddled the Confucian-Mencian doctrine, "the upper class is wise and the lower class is stupid," viciously slandering the working people. He talked nonsense: "What the common people talk about everyday concerns not the war of resistance against Japan, or the Communist Party." "What they think about is how to make money, how to get rice, edible oil, salt, sauce, vinegar and firewood, and what about their wives and children....Our thinking is as far apart from theirs as heaven is from earth." It was a big exposure of Lin Piao's idealist conception of history. In his speech he also said preposterously: "When we talk about politics and the Party, the primary question we deal with is the economic question, and we take 'production' as the banner. Some of our comrades pay no attention to 'production' and forget the origin. Communists who pay no attention to 'production' are not qualified to such.....Everybody becomes rich and lives better.... Our ultimate aim is communism,

CONFIDENTIAL

which means doing these things." Lin Piao left out classes and class struggle, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and paid attention only to "production" and "everybody becomes rich," negated scientific communism and peddled capitalism. The concocters of the "History of Struggle" praised this speech which was overflowing with Confucian-Mencian doctrines and revisionist stuff in these terms: "brilliantly refuted various kinds of opportunist fallacies." They dressed the political sandler Lin Piao up as an "outstanding Marxist." They simply have no sense of shame.

3--The "History of Struggle" praises Lin Piao as an "ever-victorious general" liberating all China in the war of liberation. It says nonsensically that Lin Piao "resolutely opposed" Liu Shao-ch'i's "new stage of peace and democracy," "resolutely carried out" Chairman Mao's great instructions, "creatively applied" Chairman Mao's military thinking, and made "great contributions" to winning victory for the nationwide revolution. During the criticize Lin, criticize Confucius movement, the worker-peasant-soldier masses have long torn off this painted skin of Lin Piao as "an ever-victorious general."

After victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chairman Mao, taking into account the changes in domestic situation and class relations, formulated the policy, "tit-for-tat and fight for every inch of ground," and called upon the whole Party to safeguard the people's gains in the struggle and build a people's new democratic country led by the proletariat. However, Liu Shao-ch'i pushed a capitulationist line of "new stage of peace and democracy," vainly attempting to do away with the people's army and to present the gains of revolutionary victory of Chiang Kai-shek so as to meet Chiang Kai-shek's need to build a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlord and bourgeois classes. In this acute struggle between the two lines, Lin Piao took the side of Liu Shao-ch'i. In his instructions to the armed forces issued on 7 February 1946, he made it quite clear: "The Northeast has definite prospects for peace." Against Lin Piao's illusion of peace, Chairman Mao instructed Lin Piao on 21 April that everything would depend on the outcome of the fight on the battlefield and he should not fasten his hope on talks. Yet, Lin Piao ignored these instructions. On 16 June in his answer to the reporter in TUNG-PEI JIH-PAO, he declared "willingness to cooperate with the Kuomintang in the Northeast." On 7 July together with P'eng Chen he adopted the "resolution on the situation and tasks" and proposed "making the northeast together with the whole country embark upon the new stage of peace and democracy." Further, they proposed "be prepared to pass from armed struggle to mass and parliamentary struggle which is not an armed struggle," and declared that the army should be "transformed into the national army." They were prepared to hand the people's army over to the Kuomintang reactionaries. Beyond any doubt Lin Piao was the vanguard vigorously pushing the "new stage of peace and democracy," and yet the "History

of Struggle" praises Lin Piao as a "hero" opposing Liu Shao-ch'i's capitulationist line!

To crush Chiang Kai-shek's attack, defend the liberated areas and develop the people's strength, Chairman Mao laid down the strategic policy of bringing the Northeast under control and defending North China and Central China. On the other hand, proceeding from the right opportunist stand Lin Piao overestimated the strength of the enemy, underestimated the strength of the people, and dared not wage a tit-for-tat struggle with the enemy. In the latter part of October 1945 the Chiang army began to invade the Northeast. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee gave instructions to Lin Piao: In order to win time for unfolding work in the whole of the Northeast, it is imperative to defend the Shanhaikuan [Pass] firmly and resist enemy attack stubbornly. Furthermore, with Chin-chou as the central area he must concentrate the main force, arrange interior-line operations and immediately mobilize the masses to create battlefields and wipe out the enemy when the opportunity presents itself. In a situation in which our armed forces had a superiority over the enemy, Lin Piao evaded battle on such grounds as "fatigue and low morale" of the armed forces and "not used to eating kaoliang rice." The result was that in less than a month the enemy occupied our Shanhaikuan [Pass], Sui-chung, Hsing-ch'eng, Chin-hsi, and Chin-chou. During the Ssu-p'ing campaign Chairman Mao instructed Lin Piao that as was the case with the Han-tan campaign he should concentrate forces to annihilate the enemy as the main thing and should not lay emphasis on defense of cities. And when the main enemy forces were advancing from different routes to Ssu-p'ing, Lin Piao placed our main force on the Ssu-p'ing-La-ma-tien line for frontal defense, in a position to be attacked by the enemy. At the middle stage of the campaign, the enemy was tired, waiting for reinforcements; yet, Lin Piao deployed our main forces on a 60-km frontline from Pei-feng in the east to Pa-mien-ch'eng in the west, divided troops to defend the passes and put up a passive defense. Later, the enemy concentrated his main force and broke through our defense line east of Ssu-p'ing. At that juncture, Lin Piao, who was described as an "ever-victorious general" in the "History of Struggle," was panic-stricken and without authority he issued an order to pull out from Ssu-p'ing. He himself fled to Harbin, leaving the armed forces without command.

In the autumn of 1948, Chairman Mao, taking into account the development of the political and military situation all over the country, firmly grasped the favorable opportunity and made a wise decision to fight a decisive strategic battle with the enemy. Lin Piao, who feared the enemy as if he were a tiger, dared not fight a strategically decisive battle, dared not fight a big battle of annihilation which had never been tried, and opposed Chairman Mao's wise strategy of directing the strategically decisive battle primarily at the enemy in the Northeast theater of war. During the Liao-hsi-Shen-yang campaign, he refused to carry out Chairman Mao's strategic plan of moving the main

CONFIDENTIAL

force in the Northeast southward to the Pei-p'ing-Liao-hing line, opposed Chairman Mao's operational policy of all-out attack on Chin-chou, and defied Chairman Mao's important instructions: Seize Ying-kou immediately to cut off the enemy's retreat. Thanks to Chairman Mao's personal leadership, organization and command, Lin Piao's interference and disruptive acts were eliminated and the Liao-hing-Shen-yang campaign won a brilliant victory with 470,000 enemy troops put out of action and the whole Northeast region liberated.

During the Pei-p'ing-Tientsin campaign, Lin Piao took the rightist stand politically, became shortsighted strategically and assumed dictatorial power when exercising command. Time and again he delayed the time of march into the region inside the Great Wall and refrained from carrying out Chairman Mao's strategic plan. Without authority he ordered some military units to drive to the Shanhaikuan [Pass] instead of Jehol, and openly defied Chairman Mao's instructions to conceal the strategic aim of our army. Before completion of strategic encirclement and tactical segmentation, he erroneously advocated attacking Nan-k'ou first, and stood opposed to Chairman Mao's policy: Encircle the enemy forces in Pei-p'ing and Tientsin instead of attacking them, or cut them apart without encircling them. Chairman Mao pointed out at once that an attack on Nan-k'ou was not advisable because there would be a certain danger of forcing the enemy forces in Pei-p'ing to flee to Tientsin and Tang-ku at an early date. At that time, Lin Piao still paid no notice to the overall strategic situation and, in defiance of Chairman Mao's instructions, resolutely wanted to attack Nan-k'ou. Without authority he ordered the main forces of two armies to drive to Nan-k'ou. Chairman Mao sent an urgent telegram to stop it. Thanks to Chairman Mao's correct strategic decision and direct command, the two field armies in the Northeast and North China cut apart and encircled the enemy forces in Pei-p'ing and Tientsin according to plan and won the great victory with 520,000 Kuomintang troops put out of action or reorganized.

Having crossed the Yangtze River the main force of the Fourth Field Army soon wiped out the military force under the command of Pai Ch'ung-hsi: this was the key to the liberation of the central-south region. In the course of battle with bandit Pai [4101], Lin Piao time and again interfered with Chairman Mao's strategic plan and missed many fighting chances. On 2 June 1949 Chairman Mao told Lin Piao in his instructions that he should fight his way straight to the Kan-chou-Pin-chou-Yung-chou (Ling-ling) line. In July Chairman Mao successively instructed Lin Piao to overtake Pai Ch'ung-hsi [4101 1504 4406] regardless of the temporary disposition of Pai's forces and to occupy his rear and compel him to fight. Lin Piao paid no notice to Chairman Mao's important instructions and, being repeatedly confounded by Pai Ch'ung-hsi, he dared not employ the penetrating and flanking tactics with daring. Earlier in October, the main force of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

40

Fourth Field Army marched to Kwangtung and Kwangsi according to Chairman Mao's plan. Lin Piao, who thought bandit Pai would fight a decisive battle with us in the Heng-yang and Pao-ch'ing (Shao-yang) area, ordered the North Route Army to stop its advance and to regroup the armed force; at the same time he arbitrarily changed Chairman Mao's plan for moving the XIII Army Corps direct to Liu-chou, and ordered the army corps to drive into the Pao-ch'ing-ch'i-yang area to take part in the Heng-yang-Pao-ch'ing campaign. On the other hand, taking advantage of the regrouping of our armed force, bandit Pai fled in the direction of Tung-an and Kwei-lin. Fortunately one division of our army penetrated into the area south of the Heng-yang-Pao-ch'ing highway and checked the enemy in the rear. Because of this, the main force of our Fourth Field Army was able to wipe out more than 20,000 enemy troops in pursuit. The victory for the Heng-yang-Pao-ch'ing campaign was by no means attributable to Lin Piao's "wise command" as trumpeted by Lin Piao's sworn confederates; it was won because some military units occupied the rear of Pai Ch'ung-hsi according to Chairman Mao's strategic thinking and eventually compelled him to fight.

As for the Hai-nan Island campaign, Lin Piao lacked confidence. He ignored the general situation in which the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique was disintegrating, and he put no faith in the enthusiasm and creative power of the army and people. On many occasions he sent telegrams to Chairman Mao and the Military Commission, exaggerating the difficulties involved in cross-sea operations and requesting indefinite postponement of the liberation of Hai-nan Island. The commanders and fighters of the military units taking part in the cross-sea operations resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's operational plan for the liberation of Hai-nan Island and liberated Hai-nan Island in April 1950.

Throughout the period of war of liberation, Chairman Mao's proletarian military line waged an acute, sharp struggle with Lin Piao's right opportunist line. The victory of some campaigns in which Lin Piao took part was precisely the result of Chairman Mao's wise command and was won by Chairman Mao's military line triumphing over Lin Piao's right opportunist line. The "History of Struggle" fabricates such myths as "Lin Piao crossed the Yellow River and the Yangtze, transited the Wu-ling Mountains and crossed the straits," "fought from the Ch'ang-pai Mountains to the Wu-chih Mountains, and from Heilungkiang to Hai-nan Island, and made great contributions to nationwide victory in revolution." These myths cannot stand the test of history.

In June 1950 U.S. imperialism launched a war of aggression on Korea, spread the fire of war to the Yalu River, bombed our Northeast region and occupied our territory of Taiwan with armed force. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee resolutely decided to send volunteers to resist the US and aid Korea. At that time, Lin Piao, proceeding from his consistent right opportunist stand, took the side of Liu

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Shao-ch'i and strongly opposed Chairman Mao and the Central Committee's wise decision. Lin Piao cried out: "Our state has just been established and some remnant bandits have not been cleared in our country. To take care of things both at home and abroad at this time is unfavorable to us." This was ironclad proof of Lin Piao's betrayal of proletarian internationalism.

The "History of Struggle" also distorts and falsifies the history of our Party during the period of socialist revolution. Instances of such distortion and falsification will not be refuted one by one in this article.

Confucius and his disciples revised "The Spring and Autumn Annals," setting an evil precedent of a reactionary way for praising and disparaging. The concocters of the "History of Struggle" inherit these reactionary tactics. They wave "the red flag to rebel so as to confound others." In the name of publicizing Chairman Mao, they make empty mention of Chairman Mao as the line drawer and then play up Lin Piao's "meritorious services" in "publicizing, implementing and defending" Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and put Lin Piao in the limelight. Practicing the swindlers' philosophy, "one who tells no lies cannot accomplish great things," they tell lies as they like, spread rumors in a fantastic way, represent Lin Piao's consistent right deviation as "consistently correct" and represent his stubborn opposition as "great contributions." Historical facts have forcefully exposed the shameless lies told by the Lin Piao group. Lin Piao was anything but "representative of the correct line" "consistently following closely." At the important junctures of the Chinese revolution, he always took the Right opportunist stand and opposed Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Lin Piao was anything but a "military strategist of the proletariat." At the crucial moment in each historical stage of development of our army, he always opposed Chairman Mao's military line, stood opposed to Chairman Mao's strategic plan, and disrupted Chairman Mao's strategic plan. Such is the conclusion of history.

Comrade Chou En-lai in his political report to the "10th Party Congress" said: "Lin Piao, this bourgeois careerist, conspirator and double-dealer, engaged in machinations within our Party not just for one decade but several decades. On his part there was a process of development and self-exposure, and on our part there was also a process of getting to know him." Lin Piao came from the family of landlord-capitalists, and as an opportunist he joined the revolutionary ranks in his early years. His bourgeois world outlook was never transformed. With regard to the errors made by him, Chairman Mao and the Central Committee criticized and educated him many times. Lin Piao not only adhered to the wrong line but always played his part as the double-dealer and deceived the party and the people with false appearance. As his position rose higher along with the deepening of the socialist revolution, his ambition soared and eventually he staged a counter-

CONFIDENTIAL

revolutionary coup d'etat and turned traitor to the party and state.

As early as in 1966 Chairman Mao incisively pointed out: "If the right stages an anti-communist coup d'etat in China, I am sure they will know no peace, rather their rule will most probably be short-lived." The counterrevolutionary coup d'etat staged by Lin Piao and his group did not and could not escape from this wise conclusion drawn by Chairman Mao. Lin Piao fell to his death in Undur Khan, Mongolia, pronouncing the bankruptcy of Lin Piao's counterrevolutionary coup d'etat. With Lin Piao buried in the sand dunes, "The Annals of Master Lin" became bankrupt and turned into a short-lived reactionary book of history. "History itself is the judge and the proletariat is the executioner." ("Speech at the Meeting Marking the Inauguration of PEOPLE'S PAPER" by Marx) Now, history has pushed Lin Piao and "The Annals of Master Lin" to the trial platform. The proletariat and the revolutionary people will go a step further through the penetrating criticism of Lin and Confucius and expose the true face of this renegade and traitor who forged history, created counterrevolutionary public opinion and staged a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat.

PLA UNIT DETAILS STUDY OF THEORY OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

Peking CHIEH-FANG-C UN PAO 18 Feb 75 p 1

[Article: "Conscientiously Study Chairman Mao's Important Instructions on the Question of Theory"]

[Text] After the publication of our great leader Chairman Mao's important instructions on the question of theory, the members of the party committee of the 3rd Battalion of Unit 6518 have been seriously engaged in study and understanding and have decided to develop the revolutionary style of study which links theory with practice, to assiduously study Marxist-Leninist and Chairman Mao's theories on the proletarian dictatorship and to carry the revolution through to the end under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The members of the party committee of the 3rd Battalion realized during the course of study that in the final analysis, our struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao was a question of whether to consolidate or to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat. If we fail to understand the theory of proletarian dictatorship clearly, we shall be unable to tell clearly what is socialism and what is capitalism and be unable to have a grasp of the laws governing class struggle and line struggle and be unable to seize the initiative. As such we are in danger of becoming revisionists. The members of the party committee said that in the past, the building of our unit was affected in certain ways because we failed to understand profoundly the theory of the proletarian dictatorship and sometimes failed to see through and boycott Lin Piao and his gang's black trash aimed at undermining

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29

the dictatorship of the proletariat. But later the movements to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work and to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius enabled us to see clearly the ultraright essence of Lin Piao's revisionist line and voluntarily implement Chairman Mao's line on army building. This brought about an excellent situation in the building of our unit. A review of the positive and negative experiences and lessons learned, educated the members of the party committee. They said: When we fail to understand the theory of the proletarian dictatorship clearly, we shall become powerless in action or even make mistakes. Fu Shih-ken [0265 1102 2704] secretary of the party committee and political instructor, said: "To grasp the principal contradictions existing in the period of socialism and to uphold the basic line of the party, we have to understand the theory of proletarian dictatorship. Therefore we must study well the theory of proletarian dictatorship and lead the broad masses of cadres and fighters in implementing the task of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat right through to every basic level."

The members of the party committee realized: To study Marxist-Leninist works assiduously is the basic way to understand and have a good grasp of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship. Thus they grasped the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the center, formulated reading plans, and studied the salient points in Lenin's "The State and Revolution", "A Great Beginning" and Chairman Mao's "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" and "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship". During the study they paid special attention to the study of the following question: Why is there still class struggle during the historical period of socialism? What are the characteristics of class struggle and what are the laws that govern it? Why is it necessary to exercise overall dictatorship against the bourgeoisie after the proletariat's seizure of political power? How should this dictatorship be exercised? What is the historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What are the class causes and social foundation that produce revisionism? How can the restoration of capitalism be prevented? To deeply analyze the class causes and social foundation that produced Lin Piao's revisionist line, Wang Te-ts'ang [3769 1795 0331], deputy secretary of the Party committee and the battalion commander, seriously studied the relevant works by Marx, Lenin and Chairman Mao, as well as made repeated deliberations and analyses. In connection with his experience he said in a study session of the Party committee: 1) Emergence of Lin Piao's antiparty clique was not an isolated happening or the result of an individual's action. Instead, it reflected the desire of the overthrown exploiting class to bring about restoration. People of this reactionary class are still here and they have not given up hope. As long as they still have a little power, they will again attempt restoration. However, as a result of the facts that the proletariat is exercising powerful dictatorship against them and that the reputation of the landlords and capitalists already carries a stench in society,

CONFIDENTIAL

they must, in addition to launching attacks against the proletariat themselves, find agents in our party in an attempt to capture the bastion from within, subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism. 2) Revisionism is an international phenomenon. Imperialism and social imperialism also want to find in our party renegades and traitors like Lin Piao so as to accomplish their plot of the "peaceful transition" in our country. Meanwhile, Lin Piao and the like are also bound to seek support from their foreign masters because they feel that they are not strong enough. 3) In our country, although socialist reform in the system of ownership of production materials has already been basically accomplished, remnant small producers still continue to exist and there are still spontaneous capitalist tendencies in rural areas. Some factories, mines and enterprises practice the socialist system of ownership only in form, the actual power of leadership is not truly in the hands of Marxists or the broad masses of workers. 4) The socialist society has just been born out of the old society. In such respects as economy, morality and spirit, old vestiges still remain in the socialist society. There still exist the three great differences and the bourgeois rights. Such things can not yet be completely eliminated during the period of socialism; they can only be limited under the dictatorship of the proletariat. As a result, they may produce capitalism, revisionism and new bourgeois elements. 5) Influence of landlord-bourgeois ideology on the superstructure, including the various cultural spheres, is still very great and old traditional concepts and forces of custom are still deep-rooted. After losing political power, the bourgeoisie and landlords will try all they can to make use of this "hereditary territory" to create public opinion for the restoration of capitalism and incessantly attack the proletariat. In our party and among the revolutionaries there are also people who cannot ward off the class enemy's fraternization and corruption because they fail to read and learn seriously and fail to pay attention to remolding their world outlook. Ideologically they readily go along with revisionism. As a result of the above factors, it would be very easy to restore the capitalist system if Lin Piao and the like come to power. Study and discussion enabled the "squad members" to realize profoundly that the opposition to revisionism and the prevention of the development of revisionism are a protracted and hard struggle. We must arm our heads with the theory of the proletarian dictatorship, uphold the basic line of the party, seriously sum up and study the historical experience of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the struggle between Marxism and revisionism, penetratingly develop criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, incessantly eliminate the soil that gives rise to revisionism and "create conditions in which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist, or for a new bourgeoisie to arise" ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol. III, p. 498). This is an extremely important task; we must fight steadfastly.

31

Chairman Mao says: "In the building of a socialist society, everybody needs remolding--the exploiters and also the working people." During the course of study the members of the party committee of 3rd Battalion persevered in the revolutionary style of study which links theory with practice and voluntarily remolded their subjective world as they remolded their objective world. Once a certain barrier between a member of the party committee and the secretary of the party committee affected unity. But later they studied the theory of proletarian dictatorship, determined to overcome their unproletarian ideas and strengthened revolutionary unit. Now members of the party committee are persevering in remolding their ideology in the course of study, enhancing the enthusiasm that prevailed during the years of revolutionary war, becoming even more vigorous and striving to win new victories incessantly for the sake of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat!

PARTY'S BASIC LINE STRESSED IN LIN CRITICISM

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 18 Feb 75 p 3

[Article: "Help the Party Branches Heighten Their Awareness of Upholding the Basic Line"]

[Text] In the criticize Lin, criticize Confucius movement, the party committee of a certain regiment in the signal corps went deep into the companies to conduct investigation and study and helped the party branches to raise their awareness of upholding the basic line. This enabled the party branches to enhance their role as combat bastions and lead the broad masses of cadres and fighters to develop criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius extensively, penetratingly and persistently.

In the course of leading the troops in the development of the criticize-Lin, criticize Confucius movement, this regimental party committee discovered that development of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius in the companies was unbalanced. Whenever the "squad members" of the party branch understood the basic line of the party profoundly and upheld it voluntarily, the leadership of the party branch over the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius became powerful and the movement developed penetratingly and incessantly. In the meantime, the reverse was also true. To further raise the awareness of the party branches of the companies for upholding the basic line of the party and to fully develop the role of the party branches as combat bastions in the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, the regimental party committee followed Chairman Mao's teaching "As regards the entire work it is necessary first to grasp well one-third of it", conducted an investigation and study of all the party branches in the regiment and formulated plans according to the situation for organizing regimental and battalion level leading cadres to stay at selected spots in the companies and help them concretely one by one at

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32

different localities and during different periods of time. In the 3rd Company of this regiment the "squad members" of the party branch once lacked a profound understanding of the basic line of the party and failed to grasp firmly the revolution in the ideological sphere. This affected the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius. Thus, Li Yung-lin [2621 3057 2651] secretary of the regimental party committee and political commissar personally led the work team to stay at selected spots in this company. They seriously studied the basic line of the party together with the members of the party branch and guided everybody to look at the leadership squad from the problems of the company and at the line from the problems of the leadership squad. The work team also reviewed the history of the building of the company and summed up the experiences and lessons learned together with the members of the party branch. During a period of time when the party branch of this company penetratingly conducted education in the basic line of the party according to the direction pointed out in the Resolution of the Ku-t'ien Conference and vigorously developed ideological work for the masses, the fighting spirit of the cadres and fighters was elevated, their unity and cooperation was strengthened and they accomplished their tasks fairly well. A summing up of the experience and lessons learned profoundly educated the "squad members" of the party branch. They said: "When we constantly talked about the basic line, a new atmosphere developed in the company. When we slackened on the basic line, bourgeois ideas attacked us." With the concrete assistance of the work team, the party branch persevered in taking the basic line of the party as the key link, penetratingly criticized Lin Piao's bourgeois military line and the reactionary Confucian-Mencian doctrine and energetically grasped the revolution in the ideological sphere against the background of the class struggle in society. This deepened the development of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius in the company incessantly.

In the course of penetrating deep into the companies, the regimental party committee paid attention to the upholding of the basic line of the party and the summing up of the advanced experience acquired in the course of criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius penetratingly and used typical examples to direct work in general. The regimental party committee discovered that some of the party branches failed to grasp firmly and attach sufficient importance to the grasping of regular education in the basic line so as to enable the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius to develop extensively, penetratingly and persistently. This was after the party branches had concentrated time on criticizing Lin Piao and the Confucian-Mencian doctrine. Sung Tao yu [1345 6670 0645] a member of the party committee and head of the political office, came to the 5th Company to stay at selected spots to solve this problem. He discovered that this company had done relatively well in this area. They conducted education on the excellent situation in socialism and developed activities to support socialist new born things against the background of class struggle and

CONFIDENTIAL

and line struggle in the society; promptly conducted education to oppose bourgeois ideological corrosion with a view to the non-proletarian ideas emerging in the company; conducted ideological education of war preparedness to criticize Lin Piao's capitulationist treason and the Soviet revisionist honoring of Confucianism and opposing of China by linking this education with war preparedness duties and the lack of vigilance among certain people; took advantage of the advantageous factor of being stationed in the countryside to conduct social investigations and realistic education in class struggle; regularized education on the basic line of the Party and made the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius lively and realistic. Thus, together with the members of the party branch, Sung Tao-yu summed up the experience in "penetratingly criticize Lin Piao and Confucius and persevere in the regularization of education in the basic line of the Party" and introduced it at the regimental conference of political work. This helped the party branches of the companies to push forward and promote their education in the basic line of the party and their penetrating criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius. During the past year the regimental party committee also summed up the typical experience of the party branch of the 4th Company in "uniting the squad members to grasp important members" and popularized it throughout the regiment.

Members of this regimental party committee realized during the course of practice that as the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius continues to deepen, new problems also continue to arise. The work of helping the party branches of the companies raise their awareness of upholding the basic line of the party must be grasped regularly, not just one time, and assistance must be given repeatedly. Once when the 10th Company of this regiment failed to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius positively enough, Yao Kuo-ch'i [1202 0948 2978] deputy secretary of the Party committee and commander of the regiment, came to this company to stay at selected spots for more than two months to help the "squad members" of the party branch to elevate their understanding of the basic line of the party and promote the deepening of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius in the company. Later, after Commander Yao left this company he continued to make telephone calls to find out about the situation and give instructions and assistance to the party branch. Once when he went to a battalion to attend a party committee meeting, he made use of a recess at the meeting to hold a symposium in the 10th Company and hold heart-to-heart talks with five of the six members of the party branch who were in the company. After an investigation he discovered that some of the leading members of the party branch were slack in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, thinking that they had done about enough in revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation and that it was time to concentrate their efforts on some training. Accordingly they failed to attach sufficient importance to the development of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius during winter training by linking the development with the actualities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

34

With a view to this problem Commander Yao held heart-to-heart talks with the members of the party branch to help them deepen their understanding of the basic line of the party and the protractedness of class struggle and establish the idea of protracted fighting. The comrades said: We must never forget the basic line of the party, we must never slacken revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation. Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius is a revolution in the ideological sphere and a protracted combat task that must be unfolded penetratingly and persistently. After their understanding was elevated the party branch organized the cadres and fighters during winter training to conscientiously study the brilliant Resolution of Ku-t'ien Conference, penetratingly conducted education in the basic line of the party, developed revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation in many forms and raised everybody's awareness of class struggle and line struggle.

LIN PIAO'S "THREE FIERCE ACTIONS" CRITICIZED

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 28 Oct 73 p 3

[Article: "'Three Fierce Actions,' A Synonym for the Doctrine of Risking Even One's Life in Military Affairs" by Kuang Kung-hsun [6782 1562 6064]

[Excerpts] Under the nurturing of Chairman Mao and our party, our People's Liberation Army through the tempering of protracted revolutionary wars has cultivated the excellent fighting style of daring to fight, unafraid of sacrifice, unafraid of ordeals and unafraid of continuous fighting. During the war of liberation, the renegade and traitor Lin Piao concocted the so-called "three fierce actions," fierce fighting, fierce clashes and fierce pursuit. Superficially, this warfare seemed to promote the spirit of daring to fight and being unafraid of sacrifice. Actually, his publicized desperadoism and adventurism were completely contrary to the traditional working style of our army.

Chairman Mao has clearly pointed out: "All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to do one's best to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy." Adhering to this principle, every fighter and commander of our army should become a brave and wise hero, not only having the courage to overcome anything but also the ability to cope with the changes and developments of the whole battle. Lin Piao's "three fierce actions" are basically contradictory to our objectives in fighting because they vigorously push the war of attrition and propagandize desperadoism. Starting with a passive defense line, Lin Piao, who being divorced from an objective viewpoint which viewed the enemy as strong and ourselves as weak during the early stage of the war of liberation, repeatedly ballyhooed such nonsense as "just fight desperately," "hit hard, fight stubbornly," "disregard the number of casualties,"

CONFIDENTIAL

35

"be tough "be tougher," "if you must die, die," in order to vainly risk our army's hard earned, husbanded revolutionary strength in one all-out clash. It was obvious that his proposal of direct confrontation and attrition was an indication of opportunism in the operational command which suited the enemy's battle plans and helped the enemy to attain its objectives. If we had followed Lin Piao's propaganda of disregarding the conditions on both sides, the development and changes in fighting, the circumstances, the opportunities and the art of fighting, by blindly stressing "fighting to the death" and "fierce clashes," we would have mired ourselves in passive positions and expended unnecessary sacrifices.

Only if our army, which possesses the spirit of daring to fight and being unafraid of sacrifice, continues to improve its technology and equipment and continues to heighten its level of tactics and technical skills, can it become like a fierce tiger and insure the winning of still greater victories in combat. During the war of resistance against Japan, Chairman Mao pointed out: "The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our employment of troops we need progressive, flexible strategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory." Lin Piao however, said, "The most important tactic of all tactics is to disregard death in fighting." "In a tactical operation, a savage spirit must be used." "We must pay special attention to the fostering of an adventurous spirit." His nonsense of using bravery to deny or to take the place of tactics is the same rubbish as his fallacious theory of using mind over matter. As a result of his disregard of tactics, defeat was certain.

Despair is a special characteristic possessed by the dying class. When Lin Piao who represented the landlord, bourgeois class concocted the "three fierce actions," and publicized the risk-everything-on-a-single-throw military desperadoism, his actions could be traced back to his class origins and historical roots. During the fifth counter "encirclement and suppression" campaign Lin Piao pursued Wang Ming's line and it caused great harm to the revolution. During the war of resistance against Japan, Chairman Mao laid down the fighting policy of independent operations in guerrilla warfare in the mountainous areas but Lin Piao again stood up and opposed it. He was infatuated with the idea of fighting great battles which were coordinated with the Kuomintang against the enemy. But this obviously was borrowing a sword from the Japanese imperialists to commit suicide.

From this, we can see that whatever was said by the swindler must be looked at closely. Lin Piao, trying to paint himself as a "hero", lustily sang the tune of the "three fierce actions." Actually, he used adventurism to conceal his conservatism and flightism in military affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

36

EDUCATION ON CRITICIZING LIN DESCRIBED

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 11 Sep 73 p 1

[Article: "The Party Committee of Unit 6927 Has Grasped Well the Education on Criticizing Lin and Rectifying the Style of Work in the Companies, Carried out Indepth Investigations, Given Concrete Guidance and Supported Conscientious Inspections"]

[Excerpts] The party committee of Unit 6927 has led the companies in carrying out criticize Lin and rectify the style of work education and supported indepth investigation and studies. It has strengthened its concrete guidance so that the companies are able to continuously carry out criticize Lin and rectify the style of work education. The specific method for carrying out the education is to effectively grasp three links in the educational process.

1--Prior to carrying out the education one must first go through detailed investigation and tightly grasp the general issues to determine the important points. Early this year, the higher levels, when arranging the education on criticizing Lin and rectifying the style of work for the companies, paid special attention to the criticism of the ultrarightist nature of Lin Piao's revisionist line. Just before carrying out the education the assistant secretary of the party committee brought his work team to the 1st company to investigate and discovered that some comrades still had an insufficient understanding of the ultrarightist nature of Lin Piao's revisionist line. Although some of them realized the ultrarightist nature they were unable to come out with the reasons. Later, the party committee organized work teams to investigate at four other companies and discovered a similiar situation. Thus, the party committee ascertained that this time it will put emphasis on helping the cadres and fighters understand why Lin Piao's revisionist line is ultrarightist. Because the issue was promptly grasped and important points were given prominence, the result of this education was comparatively successful.

2--In carrying out the education the party committee staged criticism, revealed issues, and gave concrete guidance to the cadres and fighters. In May of this year deputy political commissar Hsiao went down to the fifth company to stay. At the 5th company he discovered that while criticizing the reactionary fallacy of "history is created by both heroes and slaves" as pushed by Lin Piao, some fighters of this company lack theorectical analytical criticism. Hence, deputy political commissar Hsiao gave specific guidance to cadres and fighters of the fifth company to repeatedly study Marxist-Leninist and Chairman Mao's theories on historical materialism and to conscientiously grasp the basic principles of the materialistic conception of history. On this basis he led everyone analyzing, step by step, the substance, object, and tactics of the fallacy of "history is created by both

CONFIDENTIAL

37

heroes and slaves." He exposed the reactionary nature of this fallacy from the theoretical and political view points and enhanced everyone's theoretical standard and their capability to understand the differences. The unit party committee popularized the experience of the 5th company and effectively led all companies to carry out indepth theoretical criticism of Lin Piao's fallacy.

3--After the education has been carried out, a conscientious investigation must be staged, weak links must be overcome, and the achievement of criticizing Lin and rectifying the style of work should be continuously strengthened and broadened. After each period of concentrated training, the party committee that is not satisfied with the result of the education will continue to carry out indepth investigation and research, conscientiously sum up the experience, and at the same time find out what type of problems still have not been clarified, what type of issue still have not been criticized enough and promptly find the means to solve the problems.

FOOCHOW REGIMENT PLEDGES UNITY

Peking CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO 3 Sep 73 p 2

[Article: "Strengthen Revolutionary Unity, Win Still Greater Victories" by the party committee of the "Chi-nan (3444 0589) 2nd Regiment" of the Foochow Unit]

[Excerpt] The Tenth Party Congress has called upon us to persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, to insist on the fundamental principle of "practice Marxism, not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire" and "unite to win still greater victories." This is a summation of the experience of the struggle between the two lines within the party, and particularly a summation of the experience of the struggle to smash the Lin Piao antiparty clique. The Lin Piao antiparty clique specialized in revisionism, splitting [activities] and intrigue and conspiracy. During the movement to criticize Lin and rectify the style of work, we clearly saw that Lin Piao pushed the ultrarightist line of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism and used the counter-revolutionary, double-dealing tactics to destroy the united, victorious line of the Ninth Party Congress. We still remember the situation in 1948 after the fight to liberate Chi-nan in which our regiment participated. At that time our regiment, under the direction of Chairman Mao's revolutionary fighting line, was united as one. Our regiment together with fraternal units and with effective support from the masses engaged in hard and bitter fighting for eight days and nights annihilating 100,000 of the enemy and winning a victory. In recalling our fighting experience we feel that revolutionary unity

CONFIDENTIAL

38
was the guarantee for our winning still greater victories for the revolutionary cause.

We are resolutely responding to the call issued by the Tenth Party Congress, continuing to place the criticism of Lin and the rectification of work style above all else, fully utilizing the Lin Piao antiparty clique as a negative example, carrying out education in class struggle and line struggle for the cadres and fighters, closely uniting with the new party Central Committee led by Chairman Mao and conscientiously completing all fighting assignments which the Tenth Party Congress has set forth in order to win still greater victories.

CONFIDENTIAL

AGRICULTURE

Efforts to Increase Farm Output

Since the beginning of 1973 the Ch'iu-pei County Commercial Bureau of Yunnan Province has dispatched more than 100,000 kilograms of chemical fertilizer, more than 500 wooden agricultural tools and some 1,000 agricultural machines and implements to the rural areas to aid agricultural production. The county's agricultural machinery plants have also organized more than 40 workers to go to the production teams to repair nine tractors and 26 diesel engines and water pumps. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 25 Aug 73 p 2]

A production team in Ch'u-ching County of Yunnan has increased its tobacco output by using the leaves from the bottom of tobacco plants in addition to those from other parts of the plants. These bottom leaves, which were not used to make tobacco before, turned out to be quite satisfactory when cured together with some young leaves. When the bottom leaves were included, the average per-mou yield from the team's 50 mou of tobacco plants was 526 catties in 1972. This method is now being popularized locally. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 14 Aug 73 p 1]

The 1973 early rice production of Hung-ho Ha-ni Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan Province increased 60 percent over 1972. Double crop rice acreage which amounted to some 28,000 mou prior to the Cultural Revolution was expanded to 78,000 mou by 1971 and still further this year with 180,000 mou planted in early rice, an increase of 23.1 percent over 1972. The late rice crop planted by early July of this year amounted to nearly 30,000 mou. In Chien-shui County the early rice crop acreage for this year was increased nearly onefold over 1972. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 26 Jul 73 p 1]

Afforestation and Timber Production

By the end of June, the Ch'u-hsiung Yi Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan had afforested more than 84,200 mou of land and planted more than 22,000 mou of trees of economic value and some 3.7 million trees of all types around buildings and along roads and rivers in its afforestation drive for the summer of 1973. These figures were more than 30 percent higher than those of 1972. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 21 Jul 73 p 2]

The Yun-t'ai-shan Forestry Bureau of Yunnan Province fulfilled its timber production plan for the first half of 1973 one month ahead of schedule and exceeded this plan by 22.4 percent, an increase of 69 percent as compared with the first half of 1972. The bureau also reduced its production cost by five percent. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 25 Jun 73 p 1]

The CCP committees at various levels and the revolutionary committee of Ch'iu-pei County, Yunnan Province, have mobilized the masses in afforestation work. By early June, more than 140,000 mou of pine had been planted to overfulfill the summer season afforestation plan. Replanting on 5,800 mou, where seedling growth was sparse, has also been carried out. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 23 Jun 73 p 2]

The 1973 aerial afforestation program of Chao-t'ung Prefecture, Yunnan Province, was fulfilled quickly this year by taking advantage of the ideal dry spring weather. More than 380,000 catties of pine and varnish tree seeds were sown over 630,000 mou in Chao-t'ung, Yung-shan, Lu-tien, Ch'iao-chia, I-liang, and Ta-kuan counties of this prefecture. [K'un-ming YUN-NAN JIH-PAO 23 Jun 73 p 2]

CONFIDENTIAL